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Federal Funding of United States
Refugee Resettlement Before and
After the Refugee Act of 1980
James A. Elgass*
INTRODUCTION
When Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980,1 it explicitly recognized
the federal responsibility for refugees:
Because refugees admitted to the United States are a result of a national
policy decision and by federal action, the federal government clearly has a
responsibility to assist States and local communities in resettling the refugees
-assisting them until they are self-supporting and contributing members of
their adopted communities. 2
The exodus of refugees from Cuba to the United States which occurred
in 1980 was one of the most dramatic and highly publicized events in
recent history, 3 and the first major challenge to the new Act. While the
situation has presented many policy questions, the potentially emotional
issue of who is going to pay for the cash assistance, medical aid, and social
services necessary to resettle the refugees is one of the most controversial. 4
From the end of World War II until the 1980 Refugee Act was passed,
refugees were admitted to the United States under a series of ad hoc
legislative and administrative authorizations, rather than under a regular
statutory procedure. 5 A review of refugee policy over the last thirty years
reveals that the American response to refugee emergencies has been "hap-
hazard, incoherent and often inadequate." 6 In addition, previous decisions
to admit refugees were made without adequate consideration of their
resettlement needs. 7
The Refugee Act of 1980 implements reforms to remedy the defects of
past refugee policy. The statute's objectives are "to provide a permanent
and systematic procedure for the admission to this country of refugees of
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special humanitarian concern to the United States, and to provide comprehensive
and uniform provisions for the effective resettlement and absorption of those refugees who
are admitted. "8 The Act envisages a careful consideration of the conse-
quences of admitting refugees instead of enactment of successive tempo-
rary programs. It combines admissions and resettlement policies by
permitting the executive branch to admit refugees only after consulting
with the Judiciary Committees of both houses of Congress regarding the
impact of refugee entry on resettlement assistance policy. 9
This note begins with an examination of the problems of establishing,
funding, and terminating previous resettlement programs involving Cuban
and Indochinese refugees. These programs were limited to assisting ref-
ugees from specific geographic areas. Each refugee influx called for new
legislation, 10 and "new" programs frequently lingered on beyond their
useful lives. Uncertainty about the timing of their eventual phaseout left
state and local administrators unable to plan for a smooth transition fol-
lowing the termination of federal funding. 1 '
Part II discusses the resettlement funding innovation of the Refugee Act
of 1980. The statute, applicable to refugees regardless of nation of origin, 12
requires the executive branch to consult with the Judiciary Committees
and to project program costs before any refugees are admitted. 13 The Act
authorizes full federal funding for resettlement projects for the first three
years following a refugee's arrival. 14
Part III examines the failure of the executive branch to apply the new
statute to the influx in 1980 of Cuban refugees by avoiding its consultation
provisions. This evasion casts doubt on the statute's effectiveness in elimi-
nating the problems of past resettlement efforts. However, as suggested in
the Conclusion, the Refugee Act's financial innovation can indeed improve
the resettlement process if future decision makers apply it more faithfully
to crises such as the recent Cuban migration.
PRIOR RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMS
The Cuban Program
The Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 196215 authorized, for an
indefinite period, appropriation of funds for refugees fleeing to the United
States from any country in the Western Hemisphere-most notably, from
Cuba. The program was funded through a yearly blanket appropriation.
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) estimated the
monies needed for the entire package of resettlement programs, and Con-
gress responded with a single appropriation each year. The money for
various components of the program was then allocated through the ad-
ministrative process. 16
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HEW used the existing bureaucratic structure of the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) programs 17 to provide cash assistance,
and of state Medicaid programs 18 to furnish medical assistance. The feder-
al government fully reimbursed the states providing social services to
refugees, 19 and covered the administrative expenses involved in their vari-
ous resettlement programs. 20
Because the Cuban resettlement program lacked a statutory time limit,
individual Cuban refugees could conceivably receive federal benefits in-
definitely. Congress began debating the gradual elimination of the -Cuban
program in fiscal year 1974. At that time, HEW proposed that Congress
decrease its reimbursements to the states from 100 percent to the levels
adopted in the regular system of federal-state welfare programs. 21 Nor-
mally, under the AFDC and Medicaid programs, the states are obligated
to cover 17 to 50 percent of their cost. 22 HEW based its proposal on a 1972
Appropriations Conference Committee recommendation that "the Execu-
tive Branch exert every effort in bringing about the termination of this
program as soon as reasonably possible." 23 The department asked Con-
gress to respond by progressively reducing the Cuban program appropria-
tion over five years, ending in complete termination in fiscal year 1977.24
Normally, appropriations requests involve executive agencies seeking
larger budgets than those approved for the previous fiscal year. Here, HEW
concluded that the emergency situation which had existed fourteen years
earlier was over, and that very few new Cuban refugees were entering the
United States. The vast majority of Cuban refugees were now in the
country's economic mainstream, contributing their share of federal, state,
and local taxes. 25
Appropriations for the Cuban program were customarily included in the
foreign assistance budget. Because of political disputes over other portions
of this budget, Congress failed to appropriate funds for the Cuban program
when the deadline of the new fiscal year approached. HEW therefore
indicated that if a new appropriation were not passed before the start of
the fiscal year, it would implement the proposed phaseout without the
direct support of an appropriations bill. 26 The department argued that the
earlier Appropriations Conference Committee recommendation provided
the necessary source of legislative intent for the phaseout. 27
The governor of Florida filed a lawsuit to overturn the HEW proposal
just before it was to be implemented. 28 The governor argued that the full
Congress must decide on the merits of the proposal to wind down the
program, and that HEW should not proceed merely on the basis of a
committee recommendation. 29 Congress did eventually act, in a continu-
ing resolution and final appropriation, to maintain the Cuban program at
the nonphaseout level. 30 The same result ensued in fiscal years 1975 and
1976.31
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After its earlier proposals were rejected, HEW initiated two research
efforts. First, the department commissioned the accounting firm of Arthur
Young and Co. to study the amount of state and local taxes paid by Cuban
refugees in Florida. The report concluded that the difference in per capita
income between Cubans and non-Cubans had been cut in half in the
period between 1970 and 1976.32 Moreover, the remaining differential of
20 percent could be expected to be sharply reduced in the next three to five
years. 33 Second, an internal HEW review team completed an exhaustive
study of program operations and recommended a five-year phaseout of the
Cuban refugee program. .4 HEW reported the conclusions of these two
studies to Congress, and again recommended that the Cuban program be
phased out. 35 Congress finally embraced HEW's position, adopting it as
section 313(c) of the Refugee Act of 1980.36 Relentless pressure from state
and local governments had made it politically impossible for Congress to
accept the HEW proposal until it had hard evidence that the refugees no
longer needed federal assistance.
The Cuban program will have been in effect for twenty-two years by
the time it is scheduled to end in 1984. By contrast, under the 1980 Act,
federal assistance is tied to individual refugees, not to long-enduring
bureaucratic structures, and is limited to the first three years following a
refugee's arrival in the United States. 37 But a time limit by itself would not
have remedied the problems posed by the attempts to phase out the Cuban
program. The executive branch had admitted the Cuban refugees without
consulting with Congress, as the Refugee Act of 1980 now requires. Had
the statute been in effect during the 1960s, consultation would have in-
cluded discussions of the social, economic, and demographic impact of
entry decisions. 38 The 1980 Act authorizes resettlement programs, and
anticipates that Congress will appropriate adequate funds since it was
involved in the initial admissions decision. The experience under the
Cuban program indicates that political pressure applied by state and local
agencies will persuade Congress to approve the necessary funds. The stat-
ute makes clear to the states, however, that their programs must be geared
toward moving refugees to a position of self-sufficiency within three years.
The Indochinese Refugee Assistance Program
The next major wave of refugees arriving in the United States consisted
of people fleeing Cambodia and Vietnam during the withdrawal of Ameri-
can troops from Vietnam. 39 As the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act
of 196240 effectively applied only to Cuban refugees, the Administration
had to obtain new authorizing legislation to assist the refugees from
Southeast Asia. On May 23, 1975, the Indochina Migration and Refugee
Assistance Act of 1975 41 and a companion bill providing the initial appro-
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priation of funds were passed. 42 The State Department received $305
million for expenses incurred in transporting Indochinese refugees to the
United States. HEW received $100 million to provide the social and
rehabilitation services involved in resettling refugees. 4
One striking similarity between the Cuban and Indochinese programs
is the provision for 100 percent federal reimbursement to the states. The
Administration's initial budget request for the IRAP presumed that states
would be reimbursed for 100 percent of their costs. 44 "[HEW] feels it is
appropriate for the Federal Government to pick up the expenses for the
duration of the authorizing legislation, as we have done with the Cuban
Program." 45 Indeed, the Administration's actions demonstrated an aware-
ness of state and local government's concern that they might be unduly
burdened by the federal decision to admit refugees under the IRAP. The
director of the President's Interagency Task Force sent a reassuring tele-
gram to the governors of all fifty states:
State and local authorities will suffer no direct fiscal hardship and little
indirect hardship from the influx. The Federal government is seeking author-
ization and funding from the Congress on an urgent basis to provide: reset-
tlement, health, income maintenance, and social service funds to reimburse
100 percent of the costs incurred for these services. Backup Federal funding
authorization exists for any residual problems which individual cases may
present. 46
The hearings on the 1975 Act reveal that Congress did not want to
establish another long term program:
The Committee is concerned that this program could develop into a perma-
nent Federal undertaking similar to the present Cuban refugee program. The
Committee wants to state categorically that this is not its intent nor should
the Executive Branch or the various States interpret the appropriation of
these funds as starting a permanent Federal program. 47
The initial authorization provided by the 1975 Act was due to expire on
September 30, 1977, and the $405 million appropriation was limited to use
during fiscal year 1976.
A series of amendments extended the IRAP despite the warning issued
by the Appropriations Committee when the program began. 48 On October
28, 1977, the program was extended through the end of fiscal year 1981.49
The amendment also provided for the program's phaseout, fixing the max-
imum amount of available money as a percentage of the cost in fiscal year
1978.50 The phaseout provisions were to apply only to refugees already
admitted to the United States, but 15,000 newly arrived refugees were still
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eligible for state programs that received 100 percent reimbursement from
the federal government. 51
This first extension was designed to avoid the substantial and undue
impact on the states expected to result from the termination of federal
aid. 52 As with the Cuban program, state and local government pressure
gave rise to IRAP's longevity. 53 Expiration of the program on the original
termination date would have cost state and local governments $115 million
in cash and medical assistance, social services, and administrative ex-
penses. 5 4 At hearings on the proposed extension, local officials made their
position clear:
We believe that federal decisions carry certain responsibilities. The decision
to admit refugees to the United States implies a commitment to provide the
service and support they will require to attain self-sufficiency. We feel this
is an obligation to the refugees which was assumed by the federal govern-
ment when their admission was approved. The states in which refugees
choose to settle should not be forced to assume this responsibility because
of federal reluctance to provide the necessary funds to do the job. 55
In 1978, Congress again amended the IRAP, eliminating the phaseout
provisions but moving the expiration date from 1981 to 1979 .56 In 1979,
Congress restored the 1981 termination date, again with no phaseout
provision. Instead, the legislation granted 100 percent reimbursement
through the end of fiscal year 1981, four years beyond the original 1977
deadline.5 7 The IRAP was eventually terminated in March 1980, by a
provision in the Refugee Act of 1980. 58
A study of the IRAP by the General Accounting Office (GAO) conclud-
ed that the program's- two major defects were the unpredictability of
refugee admissions and the uncertainty about future funding of resettle-
ment programs. 59 A GAO official stated that, "Funding uncertainties and
the consequent 'starting and stopping' of programs have meant that in
some states, experienced staff were lost and never replaced, and some
social services like employment counseling and placement were never
resumed." 60 According to the GAO report, some HEW officials said that
efforts to monitor federally reimbursed contracts more carefully would be
"out of proportion to the amount of funds involved, particularly since
these were originally viewed to be temporary, one-time expenditures, and
that these Federal reimbursements thus have tended to be administered on
the assumption of the 'good faith' of the grantee."61
Much of the uncertainty about refugee admissions and the level of
funding arose from the repeated amendments of the program as deadlines
approached. As a result, HEW, state government officials, and voluntary
agencies had to plan and manage the assistance programs on an ad hoc
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basis. GAO noted that HEW's Indochina Refugee Program Office never
formulated detailed program guidelines and that important evaluation and
monitoring responsibilities had not been carried out. 62 For example, HEW
did not conduct systematic nationwide audits or evaluations of state ref-
ugee programs or of claims for federal reimbursement, although this was
done occasionally on an individual state basis. 63
REFORMS IMPLEMENTED BY THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1980
The Consultation Mechanism
The drafters of the Refugee Act of 1980 addressed a number of the prob-
lems of the earlier resettlement programs. First, the statute authorizes
federal funding of refugee assistance for three years. Resettlement pro-
grams may therefore run more smoothly than before because states will
plan their resettlement programs with a specific cutoff point in mind.
A more important change is the new requirement for consultation be-
tween representatives of the president and the Judiciary Committee of
both the Senate and the House of Representatives before a decision is
made to admit refugees. 64 Consultation, as defined by the Act, involves
informing the legislators of proposed plans for resettlement and their
estimated cost. 65 This consultation mechanism, which links admissions
and resettlement decisions, will in turn require the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS, HEW's successor) to devote more time to
evaluating and monitoring existing refugee programs in order to project
future costs accurately. Such data will be available before future refugees
are admitted and will facilitate proper planning.
The statute also requires HHS to submit detailed reports to Congress. 66
These reports must include "a summary of the results of the monitoring
and evaluation" of the assistance provided under the Refugee Act of 1980.
This provision will ensure a proper evaluation of the effectiveness of
funded programs. It will also serve to detect possible fraud, abuse, or
mismanagement. 67
In the past, the decision to admit refugees has largely been the preroga-
tive of the executive branch. 68 Congress has been restricted to considering
requests for appropriations to assist refugees already admitted to the Unit-
ed States. The 1980 Refugee Act's consultation provisions recognize that
decisions to admit refugees have both foreign and domestic policy implica-
tions 69 and require the joint action of both branches of government. These
provisions are designed to encourage planning and avoid possible disrup-
tions of resettlement programs. 70
Because the Refugee Act of 1980 authorizes extensive federal benefits
for all refugees allowed to enter the United States, the cost to the federal
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government of resettlement programs is directly tied to the number of
refugees admitted under the statute. 71 Thus, the new consultation mech-
anism mandates a realistic projection of program needs before refugees are
admitted, 72 and eliminates the possibility of ad hoc program extensions by
confining assistance to a three-year period. 73
Congressional debate documents the legislators' concern with the con-
sultation provisions. The Senate Judiciary Committee's report states that:
In considering the bill, the Committee was concerned that the role of Con-
gress should be explicitly stated in the decision-making process governing
the admission of refugees.... The bill establishes what "consultation" with
Congress means, thereby exerting Congressional control over each group of
refugees admitted to the United States. 74
The House version of the statute contained a one-house veto procedure,
which would have allowed Congress to change the president's final deci-
sion on admissions. 75 The conference committee's deletion of this provi-
sion from the bill was one of the reasons for the close vote on the House
floor. 76
The statute creates a three-level admissions system. The first level con-
sists of a normal flow of 50,000 refugees per fiscal year, through 1982.77
If a greater need is foreseen prior to the start of a fiscal year, an additional
number of refugees may be allowed to enter. 78 The determination to admit
additional refugees can be made only after the president has conferred
with members of the Judiciary Committees of both houses in accordance
with the consultation provision. 79 The final category provides for emer-
gency admissions resulting from a situation which could not have been
anticipated at the beginning of the fiscal year. 80
Resettlement Assistance Under the Refugee Act of 1980
The Refugee Act of 1980 authorizes all future resettlement assistance
programs and establishes the Office of Refugee Resettlement to administer
these programs.81 While most programs under the Act are identical to
those in previous resettlement efforts, the statute rejects crisis-inspired
domestic assistance programs:
The growth of domestic programs, through repeated statutory amendment,
has resulted in a range of separate programs offering different services to
different groups. While we hope to maintain the flexibility to respond to the
specific needs of certain groups of refugees, we also want to assure that all
refugees have access to the assistance necessary to become self-sufficient and
contributing members of American society. 82
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The provisions of Title III "assure that all refugees admitted for resettle-
ment will be eligible for the same basic benefits and assistance." 
83
The 100 percent reimbursement scheme "insure[s] that state and local
governments are not adversely impacted by Federal decisions to admit
refugees." 84 During hearings on the Refugee Act of 1980, municipal repre-
sentatives emphasized the importance of maintaining community support
for refugee resettlement efforts within states receiving refugees. 85 These
representatives argued that a time limit on full federal reimbursement
would increase the states' financial burden and could adversely affect
public attitudes toward newly resettled refugees: "Increases in highly visi-
ble taxes, such as property taxes, perceived to be related in part or in whole
to the refugee program could cause a significant reduction in the support
the program has both with the general public and elected officials." 
86
The Carter Administration offered two reasons in support of a time limit
on full federal funding. 87 First, a time limit would encourage refugees to
become self-sufficient members of the community. Second, it would be an
incentive to public and private agencies administering resettlement pro-
grams to integrate refugees into community life. 88 Congress compromised
with municipal representatives by adopting a three-year time limit on
federal assistance. 89
Cash and Medical Assistance
Cash assistance is made available under the AFDC program. 90 A refugee
is eligible for benefits if he or she meets the income level qualifications set
by HHS regulations and demonstrates a willingness to accept a job or
vocational training. Medical assistance is provided according to each state's
Medicaid program. 91 States will receive 100 percent reimbursement for
cash and medical assistance provided to a refugee during the first three
years following arrival. The states are also entitled to full reimbursement
for the "identifiable and reasonable administrative costs of providing this
assistance." 92
Social Services
Refugees admitted under the 1980 Act are also eligible for social services.
These services are provided according to the existing plan for each state,
approved by the federal government, pursuant to the Social Security
Act. 93 While these vary from state to state, they generally include pro-
grams such as day-care, family planning, hygiene, cultural counseling,
vocational services, job referral, and training in English as a second lan-
guage.
The statute authorizes an annual appropriation of $200 million for these
supportive services. HHS may award grants or contracts directly to public
and private agencies, or it may channel them through state governments.
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In either case, "successful applicants would be directly accountable to the
Federal government, because grants and contracts can be awarded only to
those agencies which the Director determines can best perform the ser-
vices." 94
THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1980 APPLIED:
THE CUBAN EXODUS OF 1980
Action Taken by the Carter Administration
The Cuban refugees landing on the Florida shores in spring of 1980 pre-
sented the first opportunity for the application of the Refugee Act. The
Carter Administration elected to treat the Cubans as applicants for asylum
rather than as refugees. 95 Section 208 of the 1980 Act prescribes the
asylum procedure for an alien physically present in the United States or
at a land border or port of entry. The attorney general must determine, on
a case-by-case basis, that an applicant is a refugee within the meaning of
the statute. 96 Treatment of the Cubans as applicants for asylum rather
than as refugees under the Refugee Act of 1980 has important conse-
quences in the resettlement context.
The refugee and asylum provisions of the statute differ in two important
ways relevant to this discussion. In the asylum context, no detailed consul-
tation with the Judiciary Committees is mandated. No limit is placed on
the number of people that can be granted asylum. Because of the absence
of consultation before admitting the Cubans, analyses of social, economic,
and demographic impact required by the Refugee Act of 1980 were not
carried out. The admissions and resettlement decisions were separated, as
in the past, and Congress became involved only after the Cubans were in
the country and in need of resettlement assistance.
The Refugee Act of 1980 is to serve as the authority for the permanent
funding necessary to support all future resettlement efforts. Those admit-
ted as refugees under the statute are therefore entitled to the extensive
benefits already described, 97 triggering 100 percent reimbursement to state
and local governments. However, the asylum provisions of the Act do not
authorize 100 percent federal reimbursement for aliens granted asylum. 98
Past experience suggests that the presence of the Cuban asylees in the
United States will produce political pressure on Congress to enact legisla-
tion providing such reimbursement. 99 Programs for the Cubans, not sub-
ject to the built-in constraints of the 1980 Act, run the risk of spawning
the problems of the past Cuban and Indochinese resettlement efforts.
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The Need for Additional Legislation
The Carter Administration maintained that the Refugee Act of 1980 was
not designed to meet the situation presented by the Cubans. 100 Frank
White, the associate director of President Carter's domestic policy staff,
stated that the new law assumed an orderly flow of refugees into the
United States, even in emergency situations. 101 According to the Adminis-
tration, the Refugee Act's procedures apply only to those refugees who
have fled to another country and are awaiting permission to enter the
United States. 102 Therefore, the Carter Administration indicated that only
new legislation would provide resettlement assistance for the Cubans. 103
Yet Carter White House staffers agreed that the federal government should
provide 100 percent reimbursement to state and local governments regard-
less of the option ultimately chosen to handle the Cubans. 104
On Capitol Hill, defenders of the statute argued that it could have been
applied to the 1980 Cuban influx. Senator Edward Kennedy protested the
Administration's failure to consult with Congress under the "emergency"
flow provisions of the Act. ' 05 Representative Elizabeth Holtzman support-
ed 100 percent reimbursement as a necessary ingredient of any resettle-
ment effort: "This is, after all, a federal problem, beyond the control of any state.
... If President Carter decides this nation should open its arms to the
Cubans, he should see that OMB opens its wallet as well." 1
06
The legislative history undercuts the Carter Administration's position.
The hearings on the Refugee Act of 1980 indicate that emergency situa-
tions are exactly those in which the consultation mechanism is designed
to work. The drafters of the statute recognized the need for a permanent
framework since refugee emergencies are likely to occur in the future:
Refugee flows, by their very nature, are unpredictable and their sources are
often beyond our control. For this reason, the bill provides for further con-
gressional consultation during the fiscal year in case of emergency refugee
situations, including unforeseen and large-scale changes in existing refugee
flows. 107
Some unresolved difficulties concerning the use of the consultation
mechanism during emergency situations remain. The executive's plea for
flexibility and control in emergencies having foreign policy implications is
persuasive. 108 None of the statutory requirements go so far as to give
Congress the authority to change the president's final determination. The
elimination in conference ' 09 of the one-house veto provision in the House
version of the statute demonstrates a congressional recognition of the
preeminent role of the executive.
The consultation provisions require discussions only with the members
of both Judiciary Committees, rather than with a larger and less manage-
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able group, which might seem to supply the requisite flexibility to deal
with emergency situations. However, the exclusion of members of the
Appropriations Committees from the discussions could represent a signifi-
cant defect in the statutory scheme, because of the eventual need to appro-
priate funds for resettlement projects. To meet the goal of comprehensive
forward planning, congressional budgetary experts-in particular, Appro-
priation Committee members-should be included in any consultation
proceedings.
CONCLUSION
One of the most significant reforms of the Refugee Act of 1980 is its link
between admissions and resettlement policies through the mechanism of
consultation. The Carter Administration failed to take advantage of this
important combination to deal with the challenges posed by the 1980
Cuban influx. As a result, the impact of the Cubans' arrival has not been
fully analyzed by legislators and administrators, and resettlement pro-
grams to assist them may be subject to disruption, indefinite extension,
mismanagement, and financial abuse.
Despite this evasion of the consultation mechanism in regard to the
Cuban entrants, 110 consultation could prove effective when applied to
future refugee emergencies. The legislative history indicates that the draft-
ers fully expected the statute to be applied to rapidly changing future
situations.
If it is applied, the combination has implications for refugee policy.
First, the consultation provisions suggest that the legislative and executive
branches must act together on admissions decisions because they affect
foreign and domestic policy. Joint action under the statute would serve as
a clear expression of American intentions and commitments. 111 This
would assist resettlement planning and "serve notice to other nations of
the degree they must share in humanitarian refugee relief efforts." 112
Second, the linkage between admissions and resettlement decisions has
implications for the welfare of future refugees. The statute clarifies which
forms of assistance will be funded by the federal government. While
Congress is still fully empowered to disrupt the scheme by refusing to
appropriate funds in a given fiscal year, it is unlikely to do so. The statute
and supporting legislative history clearly acknowledge a federal obligation
to assist refugees admitted to the United States. After consultation, Con-
gress should be willing to appropriate the necessary funds, informed from
the beginning by data on the social, economic, and demographic conse-
quences, instead of ignored until bills are due.
Another benefit for refugee welfare lies in the coordination between the
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states and the federal government in resettlement efforts. While the federal
government had to balance competing interests, most of those involved
agreed that it should give some type of guarantee of full federal reimburse-
ment. Without federal assurances, states would be unable to plan their
refugee resettlement programs efficiently. Now state programs can be de-
signed and budgets drafted in reliance on the magnitude and duration of
federal assistance.
Moreover, the drafters of the 1980 Act intended that the resettlement
process move toward the goal of self-sufficiency for all refugees: the result
is the three-year statutory time limit on federal assistance. The time limit
may seem somewhat arbitrary. However, involving Congress in the entire
process should counteract the effect of a limited program. Through consul-
tation, Congress will be aware of the impact of refugee admissions. The
Act authorizes basic resettlement programs, and Congress, because of
political pressure or otherwise, should appropriate the necessary money to
fund them adequately. At the same time, the states will know that their
programs must be geared toward the ultimate goal of removing refugees
from the welfare rolls within a three-year period.
The combination of admissions and resettlement policies through the
mechanism of consultation has great potential for eliminating the prob-
lems inherent in previous resettlement efforts. The Carter Administration's
response to the influx of Cubans in 1980 has not proven the Refugee Act
of 1980 to be an ineffective instrument of reform. The challenge to Ameri-
can policy makers in the future lies in relying on the statute to avoid the
problems which have plagued past resettlement programs.
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to review the refugee situation or emergency refugee situation, to project the extent
of possible participation of the United States therein, to discuss the reasons for believ-
ing the proposed admission of refugees is justified by humanitarian concerns or is
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(2) A description of the number and allocation of the refugees to be admitted in an
analysis of conditions within the countries from which they came.
(3) A description of the proposed plans for their movement and resettlement and the estimated cost of their
movement and resettlement.
(4) An analysis of the anticipated social economic and demographic impact of their
admission to the United States.
(5) A description of the extent to which other countries will admit and assist in the
resettlement of such refugees.
(6) An analysis of the impact of the participation of the United States in the resettle-
ment of such refugees on the foreign policy interests of the United States.
(7) Such additional information as may be appropriate or requested by such members.
To the extent possible, information described in this subsection shall be provided at
least two weeks in advance of discussions in person by designated representatives of
the President with such members.
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67 Id. § 412(a)(7) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1522).
68 The executive has used the parole power or the conditional entry provisions of the
Immigration and Nationality Act. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(d)(5) (1976) (parole power) (amended by § 203(f) of the Refugee Act of 1980); id. §
203(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1976) (conditional entry) (repeated by the Refugee Act of
1980). See 1979 Hearings, supra note 55 at 20.
69 1979 Hearings, supra note 55 at 40.
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72 1979 Hearings, supra note 55, at 39.
73 SeeRefugee Act of 1980, § 412(d)(2)(A), (e)(1) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1522(d)(2)(A),
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74 THE REFUGEE Acr op 1980, S. REP. No. 256, supra note 2, at 7.
75 The deletion of the one-house veto means that the executive conceivably could do
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76 See 126 CoNG. REc. H1520-29 (daily ed. March 4, 1980). The vote was 207-192.
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86 Id. at 266.
87 Id. at 221.
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[I] think it is important to keep some pressure on the States to move these people off
the welfare rolls and into the mainstream of employment. I think that is an important
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thing, and there is absolutely no incentive to do so if the Federal Government pays
100 percent.
Remember, the Federal Government is not out there offering jobs. The States run those
programs, and if the Federal Government is constantly picking up 100 percent of the
tab, ad infinitum, there isn't one ounce of desire on any State government, there is no
political pull or human pressure to get those people jobs. You might as well leave them
on the welfare rolls forever, because somebody else is paying the bill. And I do not
think that is healthy social policy.
Id. at 236.
89 Refugee Act of 1980, § 412(e) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1522). The Carter Administra-
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96 Refugee Act of 1980, § 201(a) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)) defines a refugee
as:
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habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nation-
ality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, or (B) in such
special circumstances as the President after appropriate consultation (as defined in
section 207(e) of this Act) may specify, any person who is within the country of such
person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, within the
country in which such person is habitually residing, and who is persecuted or who has
a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political opinion. The term "refugee" does not
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97 See text at notes 90-94 supra.
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the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the International Security and Development As-
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